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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The defendant in People v. Easton2 ' was convicted of driving
while intoxicated. 2 City Court allowed an amendment to the information which permitted an allegation of the date of the commission of the violation as December 17, 1952 instead of December
17, 1953, the latter being a date yet in the future. County Court
dismissed the information as fatally defective. The Court of Appeals reversed, and reinstated the judgment of City Court on the
grounds that the amendment was allowed to correct a typographical error in the information, and that no purpose would have been
served by a new information alleging the correct date sworn to by
the arresting police officer, who was in court at the time amendment was sought, since defendant had ample notice of the crime
charged and was neither surprised nor prejudiced by the correction. The court took pains to distinguish the amendment of the
information from an amendment to an indictment, and pointed out
the established rule in other jurisdictions which allows a court to
amend freely an information even as to matters of substance.3
In a dissenting opinion by Judge Dye, in which Judge Froessel
concurred, it was emphasized that an indictment which charges
the commission of a crime subsequent to the finding of the same by
the grand jury may not be amended, for the defect is deemed one
of substance and not form.24 The logical analogy from such a defect
in an indictment to one in an information led the dissent to conclude that since in point of law no distinction exists between an
indictment and an information as to the statement of facts sufficient to constitute a crime, an information cannot be amended
when, as a matter of law, no crime has been charged.2 5
Grand Jury
a. Jurisdiction of motion for inspection of minutes: In
Schneider v. Audisi et al.,28 the Court of Appeals was presented
with the narrow inquiry, whether a motion for inspection of grand
jury minutes may be made at Supreme Court in a county and
judicial district other than that in which the indictment had been
found, where such indictment, found in Supreme Court, had been
transferred to County Court. Modifying, and affirming as modified, an order of the Appellate Division 7 denying the application
of the District Attorney to prohibit Supreme Court Justice Aulisi
21. 307 N. Y. 336, 121 N. E. 2d 357 (1954).
22. VEHICLE AND TRAmc LAW § 70 (5).
23. See note 20 supra.
24. People v. Guiley, 222 N. Y. 548, 118 N. E. 1072 (1917) ; People v. Schweizer,
160 Misc. 23, 289 N. Y. Supp. 964 (County Ct. 1936) ; see note 18 supra.
25. Cf. People v. Zambounis, 251 N. Y. 94, 167 N. E. 183 (1929).
26. 307 N. Y. 376, 121 N. E. 2d 375 (1954).
27. 283 App. Div. 253, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 874 (4th Dep't 1954).
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from further proceeding under an order granting a motion for a
stay of trial and the inspection of grand jury minutes, the court
granted that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to permit an inspection. 28 The court pointed out the general, state-wide jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, confined and ]imited in the exercise
thereof only by the Le-islature in certain situations.2" There being
no legislative restriction of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
to hear and determine a motion for inspection of grand jury minutes, even though in a county and judicial district other than that
in which the indictment was found, it is within the sound judicial
discretion of the Supreme Court judge whether or not to grant
such a motion. 30 Having settled the question of jurisdiction to
grant the motion, and noting that incidental thereto was the authorization to pass on the sufficiency of the motion papers, the
court concluded thaf although the Sunreme Court, in possession
and control of the minutes of the grand jury, had power to permit
an inspection, 1 that power was confined to such permission, and
did not extend to motions designed to test the validity or sufficiency
of the indictment, over which motion the court to which transfer
was made now has jurisdiction.3 2 Finally, the stay of the action in
County Court was held proper since the Supreme Court has inherent power to restrain the actions of parties before it which
threaten to defeat or impair its jurisdiction.3 3 Hence it was held
that so much of the petition as requested an order in the nature of
prohibition with respect to that segment of the motion which seeks
a dismissal of the indictment should be granted, and the balance
of the Appellate Division denial affirmed.
Judge Dye and Judge Van Voorhis, in a dissenting opinion,
disagreed with the modification of the order effected by the majority on the ground that there was insufficient demonstration of
anything in the record to indicate that Justice Aulisi would do
28. People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Sup. Ct. of New York, 269 N. Y. 392, 199 N. E.
634 (1936) ; see Linton v. Perry Knitting Co., 295 N. Y. 14, 17, 64 N. E. 2d 270, 271
(1945); CoDE CRm. PRoc. § 952-t. See also N. Y. CONST. Art. VI, § 1.
29. E. g., JUDICIARY LAW § 149 regulates the term at which a motion involving a
matter pending before an extraordinary term may be made; CODE CRIM. PROc. '§355
regulates the county in which an indictment is to be tried; CODE CRrm. PROC. § 344, 346
regulates term at which motions may be made for removal of an action from County
Court to a term of Supreme Court, or from Supreme Court or County Court to a term
of Supreme Court in another County.
30. The general practice of moving for an inspection of grand jury minutes before
a justice of the Supreme Court other than that in which the indictment is pending is
frowned upon as an interference with the orderly administration of judicial functions.
See People ex rel. Newton v. Special Term, Supreme Court, N. Y. County, 193 App.
Div. 463, 472, 184 N. Y. Supp. 193, 199 (lst Dep't 1920).
31. See note 28 supra at 395. 396, 199 N. E. 634, 635.
32. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 39 (2).
33. See, e. g., Colson v. Pelgram,259 N. Y. 370, 375-376, 182 N. E. 1921-22 (1932);
People v. McLaughlin, 150 N. Y. 365, 376, 44 N. E. 1017, 1020 (1896) ; Cushman v. Leland, 93 N. Y.. 652, 653-654 (1883).
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more than entertain a motion for inspection, and hence an invocation of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition was unwarranted. 4
b. Contempt, refusal to answer after immunity: Once a
witness before a grand jury is properly apprised of his statutory
immunity from prosecution for any crime disclosed by his testimony,35 even though such witness may suspect that he himself may
be one of the targets of the investigative proceedings," he may
not refuse to answer questions propounded by that body on the
of his constitutional protection against self-incriminaground
7
3

tion.

Defendant, in Peoplev. Breslin,88 was a witness before a grand
jury inquiring into the commission of the crimes of bribery, conspiracy and gambling who refused to answer questions by that
body after he had been advised of his statutory immunity from
prosecution for any crimes his answers might reveal. The Court
of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the conviction of defendant in the court below of criminal contempt of court, noting
that the defendant was not entitled to remain silent even though
he feared the implication of himself in criminal matters once adequate immunity had ' been granted. 89
Bail
As a general matter, sureties are held to rigid accountability
on their bailbond in the event of their principal's disappearance ;40
and this, clearly, is for the purpose of promoting the administration of the criminal law.41

Although the bondsman's horizon

is not, therefore, devoid of the clouds of risk, under certain circumstances the remission of a forfeited bailbond may be warranted.4
34. See Hogan v. Court of General Sessions of New York County, 296 N. Y. 1,
68 N. E. 2d 849 (1946).
35. See PENAL LAV §§ 381, 584, 996 (applicable immunity statutes).
36. Such compulsory disclosure is warranted only when the protective purview of
the immunity completely obviates the possibility of prosecution for crimes principally or
incidentally disclosed. See Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 142 (1913) ; Matter of
Doyle, 257 N. Y. -244, 250-251, 177 N. E. 489, 491 (1931).
shall be compelled in
37. N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 6 provides that no person ...
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
38. 306 N. Y. 294, 118 N. E. 2d 108 (1954).
39. See. r. g., Matter of Doyle, note 36 supra; Matter of Rouss, 221 N. Y. 81, 116
N. E. 782 (1917) ; People v. Reiss, 255 App. Div. 509, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 209 (1st Dep't 1938),
aff'd, 280 N. Y. 539, 20 N. E. 2d 8 (1939) ; People v. Cahill, 126 App. Div. 391, 110 N. Y.
Supp. 728 (2d Dep't 1908), aff'd, 193 N. Y. 232, 86 N. E. 39 (1903).
40. See People v. Parkin,263 N. Y. 428, 432, 189 N. E. 480. 482 (1934).
41. People v. Schwarze, 168 App. Div. 124, 126, 153 N. Y. Supp. 111, 112 (2d Dep't
1915) ; People v. Licenziata, 230 App. Div. 358, 360, 244 N. Y. Supp. 731, 733 (2d Dep't
1930), afftd. 256 N. Y. 534, 177 N. E. 129 (1931).
42. CODE CImr. Paoc. §§ 597, 598; see People v. Spear, 1 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 538
(1883).

